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The Yugoslav All-People's Defense System is designed to
project cooperation and unity, to prepare the society for
long-lasting resistance, and to equip and to train the entire
nation for defense, while deterring all possible invaders.
The two most important factors in the All-People's Defense
system are will power and fire power: the intangible and
the tangible. This study examines these factors and evalu-
ates their impact on the All-People's Defense system. The
willingness to fight for Yugoslavia rather than the constitu-
ent republics and regions - is always in doubt. Fire power -
the ability of the Yugoslav economic system to project material
strength through agriculture, communications, industry, and
transport - is questionable.
The All-People's Defense system suffers from various
deficiencies as do other defense strategies. It is, however,
the strategy that best fulfills the economic, political, and
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the passing of Tito, Yugoslavia may well feel threat-
ened by the Soviet Union. This threat can manifest itself
politically, economically, militarily, or a combination
thereof. This study will, however, concern itself only with
the military threat, and the ability of the Yugoslav All-
People's Defense (APD) to withstand that Soviet military
invasion.
The purpose of this study is to take a critical look at
the APD, the will of the people, and the economic capabili-
ties, and to make an evaluation of the credibility of the APD
in the scenario of a Soviet invasion. For this to be accom-
plished two major assumptions must be made. Soviet decision-
makers have determined that the benefits are worth the risk
and cost. The world reaction will be no more than that which
was experienced following the actions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Afghanistan. The second assumption is that the Soviets
were not invited into the country by any segment of Yugoslav
government or party.
A person unfamiliar with the geostrategic importance of
the Balkans may well ask, "Why a concern over Yugoslavia -
is it not already a communist country?" It is, but it is not
aligned with the Soviet Union; and, it does not belong to
the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) . Yugoslavia, the largest
3

of the Balkan countries, sits astride the military, economic,
and communications lines that connect Europe and the Soviet
Union with Africa and the Middle East. Soviet control of
Yugoslavia may well fill the void created by the loss of
influence in Egypt; by-pass the Montreaux Convention with
ports on the Adriatic; resurrect communist guerrilla problems
for Greece, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) ; and place political, as well as economic pressure on
Italy and Austria. Soviet gains in this area are NATO's
losses.
Yugoslavia proposes to prevent military invasion by East
or West with the All-People's Defense (APD) system. The APD
calls upon every man, woman, child, and organization to defend
Yugoslavia. It incorporates conventional as well as uncon-
ventional (guerrilla) warfare into the defense, proposing to
make military occupation by the invader a necessity - a long
arduous occupation meeting active and passive resistance from
all segments of Yugoslav society.
For this to be accomplished successfully, Yugoslavia must
have not only the will of the people but the wherewithal to
support the APD. There are enough indicators present today
to raise doubt about the credibility of the APD. Political
loyalties to Yugoslavia, as opposed to its constituent nations,
are fragile and the economy worsens, driving a wedge between
the doubting republics even deeper.

Does the APD really project the desired military deter-
rent? What are the weaknesses of the APD? Will the people
join together in the defense of Yugoslavia, or will there be
a recurrence of the problems present in WW II - internecine
struggle with Yugoslav killing Yugoslav? Can the fractured
and fragile economy support a military defense? Has the
nonaligned political position isolated Yugoslavia from assist-
ance? Is the transportation and communications infrastructure
adequate for defense and subsequent counter-offense? Has
urbanization with its demographic changes in population changed
value systems that will affect the APD? Can the Yugoslav
economy support the APD with food, weapons, ammunition, and
clothing? These and other questions will be examined in this
study.
Chapter II depicts a hypothetical combined WTO and Soviet
attack. The task organization of the invading force is de-
signed to permit speed, mobility, and mass which will administer
a coup de grace within a short period of time. A very broad
look at the Yugoslav order of battle follows. Glaring weak-
nesses are found in the command and control procedures as
well as the weapons systems.
Chapter III illustrates the historical ethnic differences
with Yugoslavia. The present day difficulties in Kosovo, an
autonomous province in southern Serbia, bring these animosi-
ties into perspective. Cooperation and unity between Territorial
Defense Forces (TDF) , an equal partner with the Yugoslav
10

People's Army (YPA) in the APD, depends on the ability of
these Yugoslav nations to place national interests above
those of the republics. This cooperation, or lack thereof,
is the most vital ingredient to a successful APD strategy.
Chapter IV broadly examines the regional economic dis-
parities, transportation infrastructure, agriculture production,
demographic changes, domestic weapons production, and their
potential effects on the APD. The system, to function, must
unite the will of the people with the material of war. This
chapter proposes that Yugoslavia does not have the economic
strength to support the APD during peacetime or wartime.
Yugoslavia will not be able to support a prolonged defense
without assistance from external sources.
The final chapter summarizes the paper and concludes that
even with ethnic and economic weaknesses within Yugoslavia,
the APD is still the best defensive strategy that the medium-
sized state can support.
The author gratefully appreciates the guidance, counseling,
and assistance provided by Dr. Jiri Valenta, Coordinator,
Soviet and East European Studies, National Security Affairs
Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. It was largely
through his efforts that I was able to have access to the
following knowledgeable individuals: Dr. A. Ross Johnson, a
senior analyst of Yugoslavia, RAND Corporation; Dr. John C.
Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Wayne Vucinich,
Stanford University; Ambassador Raymond Garthoff; Hungarian
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Ambassador Janos Radvanyi; Dr. Robert Dean; Dr. Joseph
Douglass; Dr. Jon L. Lellenberg; and Mr. John Potter, Defense
Intelligence Agency. I was very fortunate to be able to
discuss my research with these individuals who aided and
improved the study.
I would also like to thank Dr. Robert Looney, Naval Post-
graduate School; and Dr. Stephen A. Garrett, Monterey Institute
for International Studies, for their advice and assistance.
A special and heartfelt thanks is forwarded to Major Joseph
Conn, a fellow Foreign Area Officer, stationed in Yugoslavia,




II. SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN YUGOSLAVIA;
POLARKA REVISITED
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) relies
on a total defense system to serve as a deterrent against any
possible invasion. The All-People's Defense (APD) system
incorporates federal forces, the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA)
with Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) , and Civil Defense (CD)
.
These forces are able to move from conventional warfare to
unconventional warfare and back again bringing every man,
woman, and child into the defense. The APD, however, is
untested in battle. This chapter depicts a hypothetical
attack by the Warsaw Pact (WP) armies and the defense of
Yugoslavia by the APD.
Yugoslavia, the largest Balkan State, has two ingredients
of a confrontation area: political uncertainty and high
geostrategic value. Since 1948, when Yugoslavia was expelled
from the Comintern, the SFRY has developed its own road to
socialism. Efforts by the Soviet Union to seek rapprochement
have often led to increased, rather than decreased, tensions
between these communist nations. The Hungarian crisis and
the invasion of Czechoslovakia were indirect results of the
rapprochement effort. With the Belgrade Declaration of 19 55,
the Soviet Union implied recognition of Titoism. That, coupled
with the de-Stalinization effort by Khruschev, suggested that
13

the Soviet Union would permit a "separate road" to communism
in other countries as well as Yugoslavia.
Over the years the relationship has ebbed and flowed as
the SFRY has attempted to remain independent and nonaligned
while not offending either super power. Yet, to the Soviet
Union it has appeared that Yugoslavia has moved closer to the
European neutrals and Mediterranean neighbors than a nonaligned
communist nation should. Apparently, a factor in the Soviet
decision to invade (hypothetical) , was the feeling that the
order of modifiers used by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister,
Milos Minic, "Yugoslavia is a European, Mediterranean, non-
aligned and developing country" accurately reflects Yugoslav
attitudes.
Does the Soviet Union hold the heretical SFRY responsible
for the adverse actions of some WP nations? The Soviet Union
has watched Nicolai Ceausescu, of Romania, develop an autonomous
foreign policy which, of late, has been in conflict with the
Soviet Union. Poland, experiencing severe economic problems,
appears to be seeking a solution similar to the Yugoslav
"self-management" economic program where the workers have con-
siderable influence in the planning and management of the
economy. The Soviet Union hopes to demonstrate to potential
deviants that this form of communism will no longer be permitted
to contaminate the system.
Yugoslavia is strategically nestled in the Balkans amidst
seven nations. Three of them, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria,
14

are members of the Warsaw Pact; two of them, Italy and Greece,
are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
;
while Austria, a non-communist nation, and Albania, a communist
nation, remain neutral. An independent and nonaligned Yugoslavia
permits "business as usual." A Yugoslavia, performing as a
member of the Warsaw Pact, however, changes the strategic bal-
ance in the Mediterranean. The southern NATO flank, Greece
and Turkey, will be isolated and inherently weakened. The
threat to the west would be increased; the envelopment of West
Germany would also be enhanced.
Yet, the most concrete benefit is the acquisition of warm
water ports in the Mediterranean (Adriatic) , a centuries old
ambition of Russia. Kotor, Rijeka (Fiume) , and Split would
provide naval bases that would be unemcumbered by the Montreaux
2Convention of 1936. The land route to the Mediterranean would
be established; and, air bases, that would assist in influenc-
ing Africa and the Middle East, and would provide air support
for the Mediterranean (Black Sea) fleet, would now be under
Soviet control.
Yugoslavia is primarily a country of hills and mountains
which would influence the military operations (Fig. 1) . The
only significant lowland is the large Pannonian plain in the
north. Except for this lowland the country is made up of rug-
ged highlands having numerous mountain peaks and ridges, narrow
steep-sided valleys, and scattered nearly level basins. Ele-
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hills and plains, containing the majority of Yugoslavia's
commercial agricultural land, cover about one-third of the
area and form a rough oval from Zagreb, Croatia, in the north-
west to Nis, Serbia, in the east. A few minor mountain ranges
interrupt these lowlands. Mineral, metal, and timber exploi-
tation are important activities there. The chief mountain
chain, the Dinaric Alps, runs parallel to the Adriatic coast.
Much of this rugged terrain along the Adriatic Sea is
characterized by underground drainage and caverns, shallow
sinkholes, deep narrow valleys, cliffs and depressions with
relatively flat floors and steep sides.
Closely spaced urban and rural settlements are connected
by a network of roads and railways in the plains area. Cities
other than Belgrade and Zagreb are generally small, have dense-
ly built-up cores, and include residential suburbs that have
concentrations of industry.
An irregularly shaped, elongated country, Yugoslavia occu-
pies a northwest to southeast area of about 9 8,000 square
miles, a size comparable to Wyoming. The country is the
largest of the Balkans and is about 550 statute miles long;
its greatest width is 260 miles. The country becomes hard
to defend not only because of its length but also because of
the required long lines of communications. Given an attack
from the east bloc nations, it is assumed that one third of
the nation, the northern plains, would soon be lost. The
defense of Yugoslavia would be conducted, as in the past,
17

from the mountains which dominate the republics of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, as well as parts of
Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia.
Yugoslavia is interestingly similar to Afghanistan in
four distinct ways. Both nations profess to be nonaligned:
they border on the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc; they have
defensible mountain terrain; and finally, both nations have
a deep-rooted warrior tradition. If history is any true
indicator, the Yugoslav warrior will fight; but, as chapter
three will illustrate, he often fights against another Yugoslav
warrior.
Added to the knowledge gained from the invasion of Afghan-
istan, a study of the terrain and the defense system of
Yugoslavia will dictate a specific tailoring of the invading
force: armor, mechanized infantry, airmobile, and airborne
units to capitalize on speed, firepower, and mobility. As
B-H Liddlell Hart point out in History of the Second World
War , the German armored forces had been as "irresistible as
in the plains of Poland and France, despite the Yugoslav
3
mountain obstacles they met." Mechanized forces should per-
form as well today. Forces from Bulgaria and Hungary may be
mixed with Soviet forces to project a Warsaw Pact solidarity
and to take advantage of any irridentist leanings with the
ethnic populations of Macedonia and Vojvodina. The suggested
annexation of these areas, similar to World War II, (See
4
Chap. 3, p. 43) may provide incentives to these nations.
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In order to reach the tactical force ratio (Fig. 2) of
40-45 divisions the Soviet Union needs to draw upon not only
the forces from Bulgaria and Hungary, but also from Soviet
forces stationed in the northern tier of the Warsaw Pact and
the southern and eastern areas of the USSR. Bulgaria would
probably provide four motorized rifle divisions (MRD) and
three tank brigades; Hungary would probably provide three
MRD and two tank brigades. That represents approximately
half of their respective forces.
These 40-4 5 divisions would be under the operational
control of a Front (Fig. 3) . These combat divisions assigned
to the Front are further assigned to armies. A large Front
might have as many as seven armies with up to 40 divisions.
Armies, tank or combined arms, are to drive rapidly toward
"deep objectives," destroy any enemy strategic reserves, or
maneuver rapidly to the flanks to encircle large enemy
7groupings.
With the above information, an attack can be hypothesized:
Avenue of Approach 1: Three armies, with 14 divisions,
attack from western Hungary toward Rijeka, to secure
Zagreb and Ljubljana, and the Dalmation coast from Zadar
to Dubrovnik;
Avenue of Approach 2: Three armies, with 20 divisions,
attack from eastern Hungary to secure Belgrade, Sarajevo,
and the resources near Manja Luka;
Avenue of Approach 3: One army, with 7 divisions, attacks
from Bulgaria up the Morava valley to secure Nis and
assist in the Belgrade operation and to secure Skoplje
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Attack zones are carefully chosen from within the overall zone of advance. The main attack area will
be weighted to achieve the desired force ratios shown above. If necessary, measures are taken
in the main attack area to
• Reduce unit frontages
• Limit distances and intervals between units and personnel
• Augment organic artillery with Front and Army assets. (Fire support is also enhanced by
increased allocation of scheduled ground attack sorties from tactical aviation.)
Figure 2. Desired Soviet Tactical Force Ratios






























































*A typical front could have three or four combined arms armies and one or two tank armies.
Figure 3. A Typical Soviet Front
SOURCE : Organization and Equipment of the Soviet Army ,
Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 31 July 197 8, P. 1—1.
21

* Airborne and airmobile operations would be conducted on
and around Sarajevo to prevent withdrawal of SFRY troops
** Naval operations would be conducted near the Strait of
Otranto to signal that resupply of Yugoslavia will not
be tolerated 8 (Fig. 4)
.
If successful, the Warsaw Pact armies will have secured
the political headquarters of the major republics, enveloped
the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) , secured the natural resources
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and controlled the port facilities at
Rijeka, Split, and Kotor. Speed and surprise are of paramount
importance.
Will the Yugoslav Defense system defeat the threat? Ever
since the Comintern expelled Yugoslavia, the SFRY has attempted
to design a defense system that will secure their position as
an independent and nonaligned nation. During the years preced-
ing the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the SFRY had relied on a
conventional military force, the YPA.
Following that invasion, the leaders of Yugoslavia realized
they would need to revise and upgrade their defense system.
The old system was very expensive, consuming over 22 percent
9
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) , out of date with the
internal socio-ethnic changes being made in Yugoslavia and
judged by Yugoslav military leaders to be ineffective against
the Warsaw Pact armies.
In 1969, the SFRY passed the National Defense Act and
reinstituted the "Partisan" concept of war: All-People's



















































outlays for defense to 6 percent of GDP; to decentralize the
military and bring it into harmony with political and econom-
ical decentralization; and, to create a credible deterrent
that capitalizes on the warrior tradition of the South Slavs.
The National Defense Act included not only the YPA but created
the TDF and Civil Defense (CD)
.
The organizational structure of the APD made the YPA and
the TDF equal under the command of the General Staff (Fig. 5)
.
The YPA continues to represent the SFRY as the nation's active
military force. The TDF, however, is organized at republic,
autonomous province, commune and other socio-political commu-
nity levels. It is responsible for organizing, developing,
and equipping its armed forces - to include weapons, military
equipment, manning, logistic support and other needs.
The APD functions with six army regions, a naval region
and an independent military region (Fig. 6) . There is a close
correlation between the army regions and the republics. With-
in the army region there are normally three to four military
regions which, in turn, consist of military districts. (This
does not reflect the tactical disposition of the Yugoslav
forces.) These commands are responsible for the administra-
tion, logistics, and the planning and execution of the
12
mobilization of their territories.
The strength of the total armed forces is 259,000 (145,000
conscripts) of which the army has 190,000 men (130,000 con-






























































































































































Army Region Commands in Yugoslavia
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Figure 6. The Administrative Army Region Commands
SOURCE: Vego, "Yugoslav Ground Forces," p. 22
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- 8 infantry divisions
- 7 independent tank brigades
- 12 independent infantry brigades
- 2 mountain brigades
- 1 airborne battalion
- 12 artillery, 6 anti-tank regiments
- 12 anti-aircraft artillery regiments
* The Navy has an additional 25 coastal artillery batteries.
It is estimated that the Para-Military Forces and Reserves
13
number 1,516,000 of which 1,000,000 are assigned to the TDF.
These forces are equipped with old U.S. and Soviet weapons
as well as domestically produced armament (Fig. 7) . The
majority of armor and artillery pieces are supplied through
the Soviet Union. Except for the domestically produced M9 80
mechanized infantry combat vehicle, the Yugoslavs depend on
the M60, an older indigenously produced personnel carrier.
Realizing the Warsaw Pact armies rely on mobility, speed,
the desire to remain mounted when possible, the lack of a
good mobile defense force is a weakness of the APD.
The artillery pieces are foreign-produced and are not
self-propelled. Without mobility, it will be difficult for
the artillery to support an active defense and keep ahead of
the fast advancing WP armies. To augment the artillery the
Yugoslavs have developed a towed multiple rocket launcher
(MRL) but again mobility is poor. (Self-propelled artillery
pieces and MRLs would create difficulties for guerrilla
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Commando armored vehicles BTR50PU
Reconnaissance cars BTR40PB/BRDM2
Battlefield support rochets 40 Frog- 7 (Luna)
Surface-to-surface missiles SSC2C Samief
Multiple-focket launchers YMRL32 (32x128) Ogw»fs
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' 1-barrel'
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Coastal guns 122mm M37 88mm Flak-36"
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Man-portable surface-to-air missiles SA7 Grail (Slrela)
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40mm i, 60 Bolors
88mm Flak-36 A
12 7mm M55
Antitank guided missiles AI3 Sagger
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76mm M 18 Hellcat
90mm M36 Jackson SP
105mm M7B2
1 Kept in reserve units
2 fo be replaced with tne M980 MICV
3 Probably not in service
4 In coastal artillery
5 Publicly revealed in 1975 Mounted on a chassis modeled alter Ihe Czech BM2ltUtra 313)
6 Modeled alter the Czech RM13U
J Revealed m 1977 Commando type for armament ol territorial defense and airborne units
8 EiGerman
9 Ei US MWIAI and German M/g/40
10 Produced under Swiss license Hispano Suiza antiaircraft gun HSS601 and HSS630 3 towed carnage
1
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12 C/ech Mounted on Praga6«6WS truck M5J has open mounting V59 partially enclosed mounting
13 Air droppable
14 Modilied 7.34755 chassis
Abbreviations AtGM = Antitank guided missile
MICV = Mechanized mtanlry combat vehicle
SP = Selt propelled
Sources Janes Infantry Weapons 1978 franklin Walts Inc NY 1978
Janes Weapon Systems 1978 franklin Watts Inc N Y 1977
Soldat und Techntk 1978
front (Belgrade)
Narodna Armna (Belgradel
Figure 7. Yugoslav Ground Forces:
Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E)
Cited by Vego, "Yugoslav Ground Forces," p. 24.
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The APD, with their outdated anti-tank weaponry, will
have to confront a massive mechanized force. Except for
wireguided Soviet AT-1 Snapper and AT-3 Sagger (ATGM) missiles,
the APD must rely on AT guns. Not only is effectiveness
questionable but survivability as well when these weapons
confront modern T-7 2 tanks. Range and effectiveness of the
line-of-sight ATGM will also be diminished when positioned in
rolling, mountainous terrain. In contrast to the towed artil-
lery, much of the AT weaponry is self-propelled. Deployment
of these weapons in the mountain areas will also pose a prob-
lem for the APD.
To meet the massive air assault the APD will rely on self-
propelled SA-6s and SA-9s when the attack is in the plains.
But when the combat operations move to the mountains the APD
will depend on the SA-7, a questionable weapon against modern
aircraft.
Another problem to be faced by the APD is electronic
warfare CEW) . Each Soviet tactical air army has several or-
ganic support squadrons with aircraft equipped to conduct EW
missions. These units can conduct electronic reconnaissance
missions and electronic countermeasures (ECM) which includes
jamming against radar (required for SA-6s) , electronic
guidance, and communications.
The Yugoslavs are aware of their shortcomings and have
attempted to compensate by developing a defense plan for
survivability. Obviously the YPA alone, inadequate and
2a

dysfunctional, could not survive against the overwhelming
strength of the WP armies. Yet, the TDF alone, would forfeit
the agricultural plains and the cities. (In 1981 the cities
are far more important to Yugoslavia than they were in World
War II when 7 5 percent of the country was rural.) The best
properties of both the YPA and the TDF were brought together.
A descending transformation from conventional warfare to
guerrilla warfare is required. The YPA, with TDF reserves,
and excellent intelligence to pinpoint the avenues of approach,
16
must delay the attack long enough for the APD to mobilize.
Ideally, the APD will force a long and protracted war by:
1. Extending and fragmenting the enemy's supplies and
forces;
2. Restricting use of armor and mechanized infantry; and,
3. Destroying the morale of the enemy soldier.
This citizen defense concept requires active and passive
resistance. Noncooperation and noncompliance, work slowdowns,
sabotage, resupply of food and clothing, and medical assis-
tance are a few of the nonmilitary ways the citizen assists
in the defense effort. Successful partisan warfare will allow
the APD to survive and wear down the invader. After a period
of time, the SFRY envisions the ability to make an ascending
transformation to conventional warfare and to expel the enemy.
The necessity to conduct joint YPA and TDF operations, to
conduct independent and isolated TDF operations under a heavy
EW environment places great burdens on the command and control
3Q

of the APD. The command and control of the APD is not com-
parable to western systems. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Sava
Stepanovitch states, "It incorporates political, ethnic and
18
sociological, as well as military motives and objectives."
This is illustrated by the composition of the APD in which
the TDF and YPA are coequals under the General Staff and where
the disposition of the YPA corresponds closely to the terri-
tory of the constituent republics as well.
Recently, changes have been made that give greater respon-
sibility to the TDF. Some TDF units will be under operational
control of the YPA tactical area commander and released from
the TDF command during joint operations. Conversely, when a
YPA unit is cut-off from the Supreme Command the highest
element left of the republic TDF command will assume control.
For example, if a joint TDF/YPA unit has been pushed from one
republic to another and has lost communications with the Gen-
eral Staff, then the receiving republic's highest TDF element
19
will assume control of the joint TDF/YPA force.
Normally though, the TDF units are not subordinated to
the YPA. Every socio-political unit has the obligation and
responsibility to "organize total national defense and to
20
command battle directly." General Nikola Ljubicic, Yugoslav
Minister of Defense, states, "The TDFs are the most massive
part of the armed forces and are organized, armed, trained,
and prepared for action on the entire territory of the coun-
21try." Conceivably a Croat TDF unit may fight on Macedonian
soil and fall under the command of the Macedonian TDF commander
31

The APD claims a flexible, elastic system of command.
Yet, since combat action varies in form, mode, and place,
tightly coordinated command and control will be required or
there could be any number of independent actions fought through-
out the country. To compound these difficulties, the Yugoslavs
recommend combat initiative not only by the TDF units but
also by all fighters, indicating that every citizen will take
22
action against the enemy. General Ljubicic recognizes these
control problems but does not provide definitive answers.
Operations could not be conducted and would be unthink-
able without the precise coordination of units of the
various arms of the services within the framework of
combined compositions, or without coordinations of units
of armed services , achieved through uninterrupted
command. 23
There are, in addition to the above problems, competing
demands and requirements for commitment of TDF formations
between various territorial-political units. Air defense,
artillery, and workers battalions have multiple missions
and must be provided priorities.
How will these potential command and control problems
affect the various missions of the APD? The TDF alone has
four missions:
1. To fight the enemy independently or in conjunction
with the YPA;
2. To combat the enemy on temporarily occupied territory
and engage in other forms of resistance;
3. To secure the population, territory, work and other
organizations; and
24
4. To rescue life and property.

Can these be coordinated and controlled by the General Staff?
More importantly, beyond these major difficulties mentioned
in this chapter lie the two critical variables of the Yugoslav
All-People's Defense System:
- the collective will of the people within the context
of political disunity, ethnic enmity, and regional rivalry;
- the economic ability of the defense system to provide
arms, ammunition, food, and other equipment.
Does this system have credibility? Are the invaders, as
well as the defenders, convinced that Yugoslavs are willing
to risk their lives in defending the country at any cost?
Cooperation and unity are necessary for the system to survive.
Chapter three will examine the old internal rivalries that
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It is very important to realize that the formation of
a Front with seven armies creates a much more sizeable force
than 40-45 divisions. Fire power and maneuverability (tacti-
cal air army, artillery division, multiple rocket launcher
brigade, and combat service support equipment) are greatly
increased.
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III. A SHOTGUN MARRIAGE:
NATIONAL TENSIONS PERSIST
Ethnicity has been the plague of Eastern Europe, espe-
cially in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is inhabited by several
nations, the South Slavs, and several nationalities whose
parent nations are outside Yugoslavia (Table 1) . How well
these 'nations' and 'nationalities' will fight together as a
united and cooperating force is a major concern to those
evaluating the Yugoslav All-People's Defense (APD) system.
Following World War I and the disintegration of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the South Slavs, except for the
Bulgars, were united within a political nation-state for the
first time in their history. The Declaration of Corfu,
20 July 1917, asserted the determination of the Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes to unite under the principle of national self-
determination. The Treaty of Versailles united the South
Slavs under a Kingdom. It was not a 'melting pot' but rather
a 'salad bowl' of sharply contrasting ingredients. This
shotgun marriage united the Slovenes and Croats - basically
Roman Catholic and of a Western European character - having
been greatly influenced by Charlemagne's Empire and subsequent
rule by the Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Italians with
the Serbs, and Montenegrins, who are Eastern Orthodox and
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Difficulties arose immediately when the Croats felt they
were being forced to assimilate into a "Greater Serbia."
Personalities of these Slav nations contributed to ethnic
rivalry and lack of cooperation. (Tito was to mention later
that the Treaty of Versailles created a Yugoslavia with an
inherent oppression; the South Slavs were divided by ethnic
backgrounds with the Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins con-
sidered unequal. Those groups in Macedonia and Kosovo were
considered enslaved; while the minority elements of Moslems,
Germans, and Hungarians were used as pawns in the struggles
between the South Slavs.)
National self-determination was to guarantee religious
freedom, and a measure of autonomy. Yugoslavia, henceforth,
became one government but with two alphabets, three major
religions (Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslim)
,
four major languages (Slovene, Serbo-Croat, Albanian, and
Macedonian), five nations (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedon-
ians and Montenegrins) , and six republics (the aforementioned
five nations plus Bosnia-Herzegovina) . (Figure 8)
.
Difficulties in implementing the intent of the Declara-
tion of Corfu arose quickly. On 28 November 1920, the
Croatian delegates to the Constituent Assembly proposed a
scheme which would leave a large measure of autonomy to the
provincial governments but this was voted down. The highly
centralized government which resulted deprived the Croats



















































The Croat Peasant Party refused to cooperate in govern-
ment and boycotted Parliament until 19 24. This enabled the
Serbs to dominate government stressing Serbian nationalism
while opposing federalism and autonomy. A party system sub-
sequently developed that was based on sectional loyalties.
Turbulence and instability prevailed during the 19 20s.
The breach was complete when, in the midst of a Parlia-
mentary debate, three Croat Peasant Party leaders were assas-
inated. The Croats and their allies promptly withdrew from
Parliament; the Kingdom faced collapse.
King Alexander, fearing the dissolution of the Kingdom,
assumed full power, abolished the 1921 Constitution and es-
tablished a royal dictatorship. He demonstrated his new
powers by decreeing an end to freedom of the press, speech,
and person. The king banned all parties that were "tribal"
(Serbian, Croatian) or religious in nature. In a further
attempt to submerge the national rivalries he substituted
the name "Yugoslavia" (South Slav) for the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes. He divided the new kingdom into nine
banovines (governments) that deliberately violated the prin-
ciple of provincial autonomy (Fig. 9)
.
King Alexander was assassinated in 1934. His cousin,
Prince Paul Karageorgevic, headed a three-man regency which
was to rule in the name of Alexanders son, King Peter II.
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Figure 9. The Banovine in Yugoslavia, 1931
-SOURCE: Milan Senoa, Geografski Atlas CZagreb, 19341,
pp. 18-19. The 1939 "compromise" with the enlarged
Croatian unit is indicated. Cited by Jack C. Fisher,
Yugoslavia—A Multinational State , (Chandler Pub-
lishing Company, San Francisco, T966) , p. 22.
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In 19 39, Prince Paul appointed a leader of the Serbian
Radicals as Premier. In order to prevent further growth of
the Croat Ustasha, a right-wing nationalist, fascist organi-
zation, the Premier was tasked to reach an agreement with the
Croats that would temporarily satisfy their desires for
autonomy. The banovines of Sava and Primorje and parts of
Bosnia were combined into the new banovine of Croatia, with
its own parliament. The Serbs responded with a demand for
a Serbian banovine. As World War II approached, Yugoslavia,
with difficulties between Croats and Serbs still unreconciled
and with extremists on the right (Ustasha) and left (Communists)
,
waited with bated breath.
On 6 April 1941, without a declaration of war, the German
Air Force attacked Belgrade. On 17 April 1941 the Yugoslav
Army surrendered. By the end of 1941, Yugoslavia had been
dismembered, partitioned, and occupied by the Axis Powers
(Fig. 10)
.
Domestic separatists and pro-fascist forces assisted the
occupiers in establishing quisling regimes (the Ustasha
"Independent State of Croatia," "Independent Montenegro,"
a "commissioner" government in Serbia, the "consulta" in the
district of Ljubljana, and so on) . Repressive measures to
include mass deportation, internment, forcible conversion,
and liquidation were prevalent throughout, but nowhere worse
than in Croatia. The Yugoslav government, exiled in London,
estimated that approximately 600,000 Serbs were murdered by
42

Figure 10. The Dismemberment of Yugoslavia, 1942.
SOURCE: Ljudske i materijalne zrtve Jugoslaviie u ratnom
naporu 1941-1945 (Belgrade, 1945), p. 13, cited by
Fisher, p. 23. An independent Croatian state was
created. Germany annexed two-thirds of Slovenia
while Italy took the rest of Slovenia and the Adri-
atic coastal area. Montenegro (Crna Gora) was made
a separate kingdom, which was in personal union with
the Italian king; Italian Albania obtained Kosovo-
Methohija and part of Macedonia; the remainder went
to Bulgaria. Hungary received parts of Slovenia and
Croatia and part of Vojvodina (Backa and Baranja)
.





the Croat Ustasha in their attempt to exterminate the Serb
community of Lika, Croatia. Other internecine conflicts were
soon to follow.
Three large factions arose in the aftermath of the Axis
invasion: Ustasha, Chetnik, and Partisan. Each perceived
the threat or opportunity differently. The Ustasha were
Croat nationalists that saw an opportunity for independence
and autonomy
.
The Serb Chetniks saw the Communist Partisans as a greater
threat than the Germans. If the Partisans were to succeed,
the Chetniks feared Yugoslavia ruled by a Serbian King would
cease to exist.
The Partisans saw the invasion as an opportunity to create
a people's revolution. A rallying cause - German occupation
of the homeland - was present. Coupled with recognition by
the Allies, a growing division within the Chetnik ranks cre-
ated a situation that the Partisans were able to capitalize
on.
Yugoslavia was a troubled land. Not only were the Axis
Powers occupying it but the Yugoslavs were involved in a
civil war. By the end of the Second World War, casualties
caused by Yugoslav killing Yugoslav, would surpass the casu-
alties inflicted by the Axis Powers. Of the total 1,750,000
casualties, 1 million were killed by Yugoslavs.
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia survived. Today the Yugoslavs
revel in recounting the success of the Partisans against the
44

Axis Powers. Support for the All-People's Defense (APD)
svstera stems from this period. The defense of Yugoslavia
today, however, may not be as successful as it was against
the Axis Powers.
Yugoslavia cannot expect the Warsaw Pact (WP) armies to
give the invasion and occupation the same priority that the
Germans did. Germany had commitments on two major fronts
and was fighting for its own survival. The German units,
manned by over-age soldiers, attempted to occupy Yugoslavia
with outdated equipment and armament. German combat leaders
felt they could have defeated the guerrillas if they had been
provided abundant supplies and well-trained men. Sophisti-
cated treatment of the population, isolation of guerrillas
from support bases, and careful development of political and
military strategy could have capitalized on the internal divi-
4
sions of Yugoslavia. As for German allies, it was suggested
that the Italian troops and the Croatian Waffen SS were handi-
caps, not assets. (The Partisans broke out from two different
encirclements through the Croatian ranks.)
Jozo Tomasevich, in War and Revolution in Yugoslavia
,
defines victory in partisan terms as "surviving and not being
incapacitated for further action." By this definition, Tito
and the Partisans were successful even after suffering 35
percent losses in breaking out of the Axis encirclement, the




As the German nation neared defeat, Tito was able to
maneuver the Communists into positions of power in the forth-
coming Yugoslav government. Ethnic tensions, so destructive
in Yugoslav history, went into remission, as the Yugoslavs
attempted to rebuild their nation.
Realizing that ethnic differences and nationalism have
thwarted all efforts to create a federal union of South
Slavs, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
permitted degrees of control and power to be shifted to the
republics. Compromises were made, mostly through decentrali-
zation of government, economy, and military, in an effort to
keep all republics within the fold. "However, in the 1960's,"
as A. Ross Johnson asserts, "it became evident to the Yugoslav
League of Communists (LCY) that they had not solved the ethnic
problem but had only anesthetized it."
The years 19 6 2-6 witnessed a great economic debate encom-
passing political issues as well. Sir Duncan Wilson, in
Tito's Yugoslavia , said that Tito criticized the "excessive
large wage differentials, excessive waste of funds in overseas
travel by management, too many new cars for management, and
even the selling of Yugoslav industrial secrets" and suggested
7that firm measures must be taken. Tito wavered between re-
centralism and more economic planning at the local level.
Investment became the crucial problem, political as well
as economical, for the Yugoslav planners. Republican national
feelings revived as the more and less developed regions dis-
cussed economic development and control of investment.
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By 1964 Tito firmly favored economic reform. Too much
money was being spent by the government and not enough capi-
tal investment by the republics. Excessive demand for consumer
goods and investment funds continued; the rate of inflation
and the balance of payments deficit continued to rise.
The market system was introduced by the Economic Reform
of 1965 and, as Dusko Doder states, "It shifted decision
g
making powers to republics and individual enterprises."
This made the success or failure of the enterprise the respon-
sibility of the worker and not the state.
For the economic reform to work it was necessary for the
Party to cooperate. If necessary, changes within the Party
would be made. Alexander Rankovic, Vice-President of Yugo-
slavia, responsible for organization of the LCY, and the
secret police (UDBA) , was the most important "head to roll."
The UDBA was charged with acting in the interests of Serb
nationalism and thwarting the Reform program.
Economic reform led to political reform. A. Ross Johnson
asserts that the "decentralization created power bases away
9from the central party." Power created a drive for more
power. Comparatively free discussion on issues from economics
to politics surfaced.
The Croats took the challenge to the government most
vigorously but they were not alone in the attempt to improve
their economic and political position. Slovenes, Macedonians,
and Bosnians had special grievances of their own.
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Language became a nationalist crisis in 1967. On 17 March
1967, Zagreb's leading literary weekly called for complete
official and constitutional recognition of two separate lan-
guages. The Serbs immediately made countermands; the Lika
Serbs, a commune of Serbs in Croatia, should be permitted to
use Cyrillic and to be educated in their own language. The
leaders of the LCY reacted strongly against both sides.
In 1968, the year of "student power" all over the world,
the students of Yugoslavia proclaimed that the professed
ideology was nonfulfilling and created a stagnant social
structure - no upward mobility for students. Value expecta-
tions exceeded value capabilities and the students blamed the
12government for their inability to reach their objectives.
It became easy for the Croats to feel the Serbs were
responsible for their relative deprivation. Ever since the
war, the Serbs had dominated the high positions in government
and the military. Belgrade, the nation's capital, the Croats
felt, did not serve as a representative capital of the South
Slavs but as the Serb capital. The Croats feared that their
funds were being expropriated by the Belgrade Cread Serb)
bureaucracy, Belgrade banks, and Belgrade-based foreign trade
enterprises. Belgrade was held responsible for all that was
outdated, centralist, and authoritarian. It became accept-
able to blame difficulties on the Serb centralists. Students
demonstrated against a perceived stagnant social structure,
14
a low standard of living, and no upward mobility.
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An elitist movement emerged in Croatia which seized upon
the unresolved economic, political and cultural problems and
defined them in nationalist terms. Disturbances erupted in
1971 and continued unabated into 197 2.
Early in November, 1971, the final text of the proposals
put forward by Matica Hrvatska (Croatian Queen Bee) , a Croat
cultural organization, were published throughout Croatia.
Duncan V7ilson states that the proposals "amounted to something
dangerously close to a declaration of independence." The
proposals sought the right to self-determination to include
the right to secede from the Federation; full control of repub-
lic revenues with "voluntary contributions" to the Federation;
development of a separate Croat monetary policy with its own
bank of issue; autonomy for its TDF; and, stationing of all
YPA recruits in Croatia. When these proposals were discussed
in student meetings more radical actions were contemplated -
revision of Croatian frontiers, formal federalization of the
16
army, and separate Croat membership in the U.N.
The situation was untolerable. Tito took action to remove
the nationalist deviants from the highest levels of Croatian
leadership in 1971. The prominent intellectual and student
leaders, accused of national separatism and other subversive
17
or oppositional political acts, were arrested and tried.
Tito took this opportunity to rebuild the LCY and to
tighten discipline within the LCY. In an effort to demon-
strate to all republics that Serbia did not govern Yugoslavia,
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a series of amendments were passed that limited the federal
government to defense, foreign policy, economic control and
planning, and the enactment and supervision of law.
Like Croatia, Serbia witnessed dissatisfaction with the
policies of the regime and late in 1972 a political crisis
erupted within the Serbian League of Communists. In mid-
October, Tito described the situation as "unhealthy" and
criticized the leadership of factionalism, liberalism toward
18
class enemies, the preoccupation with local interests. Tito
accepted the resignations of the Serbian party chairman and
secretary; he replaced them with loyal Titoists.
The dissidents were not eradicated however. Conducted
mostly outside Yugoslavia by emigres, the Croat nationalist
movement continued throughout the 197 0s. Yugoslav Internal
Security forces, constantly on the alert for pro-Soviet,
Anti-Tito activity, arrested, over a two-year period from
1974-76, an estimated 200 Cominformists, Croatian national-
19ists, and Albanian separatists.
When questioned about nationalist problems and difficul-
ties, Stane Dolanc, once considered heir-apparent to Tito,
remarked in an interview, 26 January 1981,
I think we often wrongly interpret certain stages of our
development. I would not say that any cooling in the
relations between peoples and nationalities has occurred
in our country. I think we have had certain problems
and difficulties and that we will have them in the future.
The problems and difficulties Dolanc feared erupted in




19 81. What began as a student protest concerning poor campus
conditions on 11 March 1981, now has the makings of a full-
blown nationalist protest.
The Albanians of Kosovo are the fifth largest ethnic
group in Yugoslavia. The province has a greater population
than Macedonia and Montenegro yet still remains a province
within Serbia. Some overtly nationalist slogans called for
recognition as a full-fledge republic while others called
for union with Albania, creating a "Greater Albania" incor-
porating the Albanian peoples of neighboring Macedonia and
Montenegro.
How would the Serbs react to the loss of Kosovo? In the
past the Serbs have merely observed the "Albanisation" of
Kosovo, but it is unlikely that they will acquiesce in up-
grading Kosovo to full republic status. Serb latent nationalist
passions would surely reawaken. The Serbs feel they have
lost the most in the present-day Yugoslavia. Decentralization
of the government and the military has come at the expense of
the Serbs. Each little change is perceived as a weakening of
the Serb position. The loss of Kosovo implies the loss of
the Serbian national shrine, the battlefield at Kosovo Pole,
just outside Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, v/here the Serbs
were defeated, and subsequently dominated for centuries, by




The risk is high, as Anthony Robinson, correspondent for
Financial Times suggests, because if Kosovo is recognized as
a Republic, the Constitution permits secession from the Fed-
22
eration (However this would be very unlikely.). The loss
of Kosovo would almost certainly affect the delicate balance
in Yugoslavia. Not only would Serbia lose a province but,
in the extreme, Yugoslavia could lose a republic. Would the
Constitution be upheld?
Can the Yugoslav APD system expect these primordial ten-
sions to dissipate in time of national crisis? The question
of cooperation and unity arises.
The APD command and control element must make all of these
diverse nations and nationalities perform together. The wide
latitude given to individuals and small units to conduct mili-
tary operations indicates a potential for many independent
combat actions rather than a coordinated defensive effort.
The ethnic differences and strong nationalistic feelings do
raise questions about the APD. What will the response be
when a Serb unit is directed by the General Staff to reinforce
a Croat unit, or a Kosovo unit? Will they respond as fast as
the Russians did to the cry for help from the Yugoslavs in
World War II? As already indicated, the highest TDF commander
in the territory is in command of all units within his terri-
tory when communications with the General Staff is lost. Will
a Croat or Serb unit submit to orders given to them by a
Bosnian Muslim TDF commander? Can a Catholic Croat expect
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logistical support, medicine and food, from a Serb? Will the
entire APD break down - defense of hearth and home taking
priority over a united stand against the enemy? Will the
invader be seen as the enemy or the savior?
Will Croatia move toward separatism, as it did in WWII,
or will it fight to defend Yugoslavia? Will Kosovo use war
as leverage for their demands? Have the enmities between
Serbs and Croats cooled enough to permit cooperation and
unity? Will an invader be able to aggravate these hatreds
by promising autonomy to the nations as the Axis Powers did?
Are the irridentist feelings within the nationalities strong
enough to capitalize on?
These questions are difficult to answer. It has been
difficult for Yugoslavia to preserve itself as a nation-state
when it has needed to demonstrate federalizing tendencies to
keep peace with the republics and provinces. Matters of
language, education, control of the TDF, and the economy
have been causes for difficulty and concern. Nevertheless,
they are problem areas that the leaders of Yugoslavia must
face. Few authorities question the combat ability of the
South Slav. What is questioned is the ability to cast aside
the historical hatreds and to face the invader as one country
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IV. THE ALL-PEOPLE'S DEFENSE SYSTEM:
A MIRROR OF YUGOSLAVIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
The National Defense Act of 1969 reduced the size of the
Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and created the Territorial
Defense Force (TDF) . This change in method of defense saw a
reduction in federal revenues allocated toward defense from
22 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 6.2 percent.
The All-People's Defense (APD) , however, still placed a great
economic burden on the peoples of Yugoslavia. True, the
federal outlay toward defense had been reduced but the law
contained certain stated and implied demands on the economy
such as the responsibility of the republics and autonomous
regions to organize, train, and equip the TDF, to include
supply, transportation, medical and veterinary care. This
chapter will touch upon the regional economic disparity and
suggest a few defense factors that may be influenced adversely
by that disparity. Before an examination of the regional
economic disparities is made however, a discussion of these
factors is in order.
As shown by the Yugoslav People's Army Table of Organiza-
tion and Equipment (TO&E) , chapter two, the YPA functions with
outdated equipment. If the YPA, the main defensive arm of
Yugoslavia, has not been able to modernize because of the
decrease in defense revenues, it is highly possible that the
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2TDF also lacks modern equipment. The situation further sug-
gests that the TDF would be further behind in its modernization
efforts, definitely not equal to the YPA, and therefore the
ability of the TDF to conduct joint operations with the YPA
would be adversely affected.
Another factor includes manpower and training. Before
the Defense Act, the republics had little direct responsibili-
ty to the YPA other than responding to military conscription
and taxes. Now, however, the TDF, with a projected strength
of three million, not only draws from the youth that would
serve in the YPA but funds for recruiting and training the
TDF creates an additional financial burden on the republic
and communes. Proper training, especially in joint opera-
tions requires time and equipment. Each republic must be
able to equip a portion of the TDF, from sections through
brigades, and to allocate training time for joint and separate
exercises.
An implied area of concern is that of transportation and
the required infrastructure. Speed, flexibility of operations,
and resupply are greatly enhanced by a good transportation
network. Yugoslavia, however, does not have a good road or
rail network. The more developed areas of Slovenia, Croatia,
and Serbia proper have the best roads but the main network
which passes across the northern plain from east to west would
soon be lost in time of war.
57

The supply of rations and other foodstuffs is another
economic factor that the republics are required to provide.
The Pannonian plain and the Morava and Vardar valleys are
major agricultural areas in Yugoslavia. Again, these areas
should be priority objectives of the invading armies and thus
lost early to the Yugoslavs. Can the other regions provide
food to the APD during time of war?
The compatibility of weapons systems between TDFs is
another concern. Do the various TDF units have like TO&E?
Are weapons systems interchangeable? Are republic commands
capable of providing aid and assistance to other units if they
assume operational control of them? Can the regions provide
the revenue required to upgrade and modernize the TDF so it
can join the YPA in combat or fight independently in a partisan
role?
The problem facing the government of Yugoslavia is two-
fold. First, modernization of the TDF is necessary to ensure
operational harmony with the YPA, but may strain an already
weakened economy. Second, modernization, or the lack of it,
may create social and political problems which will cause a
rupture in the fragile social and economic system that would
be as dangerous as the risk of military attack and bring about
the downfall of Yugoslavia.
In supporting the APD, each community must raise revenue
to finance the YPA, TDF, and Civil Defense (.CD) elements with-
in their jurisdiction. The APD system creates the familiar
58

"guns or butter" dilemma for Yugoslavia. The viability of
the APD depends on the ability of a region to cope with its
economic problems and the "crisis-prone" nationalist quarrels
and the willingness to subordinate the local interest to
national defense.
As previously stated, the defense of Yugoslavia would
almost certainly be conducted from the mountainous regions.
Except for stay-behind forces and isolated urban fighting,
it is expected that the surviving YPA elements, along with
the TDFs, would conduct their defense from the traditional
mountain strongholds that have been used for centuries against
invaders. That type action places a great burden on the
regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and
selected areas in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. Because
of the expected invasion (Chap. 2) , it is felt that the urban
centers and major transportation networks will be lost quick-
ly. If the defense is to be conducted in the local redoubts,
the economic disparity between the developed regions and the
less developed regions (LDR) creates concern over the quality
of the APD found in those LDRs.
Weapons are stored in mobilization centers, for example,
while ammunition and spare parts are cached in tactical loca-
4tions throughout Yugoslavia. If a unit is forced to leave
its area of operation it then loses access to those caches.
The receiving TDF assumes operational control and thus logis-
tical support of the incoming unit. Is a TDF of a LDR equipped
to assume logistical support of another TDF?
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The economic disparity between the northern regions and
southern regions creates concern over the quality of TDF in
the LDRs and their ability to support other TDFs especially
when one considers that the defense will be conducted from
the LDRs.
The disparities between these regions have worsened
rather than improved over the past 30 years. A short dis-
cussion of how and why these regional disparities occurred
is due. Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina were much closer to
the industrial centers of Central Europe, and the economic
and cultural influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire laid
the foundation for modern development of the north. The less
developed regions, under the influence of the Ottoman Empire,
experienced a retarded development. This lag in economic
development is also reflected in technical and managerial
know-how differences. The northern regions do not want to
subsidize the southern regions through capital or management.
Problems in the social infrastructure as well as the
economic and physical infrastructures developed. The defi-
ciencies of the social infrastructure, which include quality
and access to education and health facilities, housing, ad-
ministration, cultural services, and facilities for health
and education, led to a diversion of a large share of invest-
or
ment resources from productive investment. These deficiencies
tend to "push" the most mobile and best educated from the
deprived less developed regions to the urban centers, espe-
cially those in the more developed regions.
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These urban centers tend to attract from the agrarian
labor forces and, once activated, more labor from the agrar-
ian community followed seeking better employment, higher wages,
housing, and other factors associated with urban-industrial
society. At the beginning it helped the industrialization
but now those migrations have drained too much manpower from
the agrarian sector.
The economy of the less developed regions appears to be
caught in a system that perpetuates the difficulties rather
than solve them. They have tended to be preoccupied with
the development of basic industries such as mining and man-
ufacturing, electric power generation, pulp and paper products
and basic chemicals. The more developed regions have placed
greater emphasis on processing industries. Why? First, the
physical availability of natural resources tended to indicate
it was economically feasible to use them. Second, each region
felt that it was only sound development strategy to begin by
developing these raw materials and that this would lead to
progress. Third, because of a lack of well-educated and
experienced skilled manpower this choice of industrial devel-
opment seemed logical because these industries require less
skill per unit investment. Fourth, the development of these
industries were seen to be less risky and easier. Fifth,
access to relatively inexpensive credits tend to create a
gbias toward capital-intensive basic industries.
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Each region has been left to itself for development,
financially assisted by the General Investment Fund and the
Federal Fund. The self-management system whereby each repub-
lic, in fact each major industry, manages itself does not
promote the transfer of investment resources, technical know-
how, or entire activities to the LDRs. Workers are motivated
by loyalty to their organization and to their community. Add
to that the lack of profit-motive, and the LDRs are unlikely
to receive volunteer assistance from the more developed regions.
A change in this attitude may be forthcoming for on 16 January
19 81 Croatia did state that they were interested in investing
in the underdeveloped areas of other republics and the province
9
of Kosovo. Kosovo, in the meantime, has reached agreement
with the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland
to develop Kosovo energy resources. Kosovo represents 30
percent of the country's total energy potential and the terms
of the agreement obligates Kosovo to deliver electric power
to those partners even when Yugoslavia suffers power shortages.
It is not that the government has not recognized this
regional disparity; it has, but has been unable to remedy
the situation. A government statement, 9 September 1980,
indicated that they recognize the regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia, and Montenegro as underdeveloped regions and Kosovo
as distinctly underdeveloped. Slovenia, on the other hand,
is well-developed, Croatia is relatively close, and Serbia
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SOURCE: Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan, and Nawal A.
Tatawy, Yugoslavia: Self-management Socialism and Challenges
of Development
,
(Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
1979) : 287, table 11.1
The disparity is most evident in the income per capita
ratio between Kosovo and Slovenia. It has fallen drastically
from 1:3 in 1947 to 1:7 in 1975 to 1:10 in 1980. 2 In addition,
the intraregional differences in income are considerable.
There are areas within the LDRs that compare favorably with
the developed regions and there are regions within the developed
regions that compare with the LDRs. Given this great disparity,
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can the All-People's Defense system, especially the Terri-
torial Defense Forces from the less developed regions be
expected to perform their mission at the operational army's
front, at the rear, or in guerrilla-type operations on terri-
tory temporarily held by the enemy?
Within the regions, the greatest differences in income
are between the urban and rural areas. With each commune held
responsible for developing its TDF this factor is important
because the urban elements will more likely than not, be
forced into the rural areas to conduct their missions, leaving
weapons and equipment, and relying upon the caches of the
rural areas.
The disparities are a result of different growth rates
of Gross Material Product (GUP) and population. The growth
of GMP in the less developed regions was only slightly lower
than that in the more developed regions but the higher rates
of population growth diluted the benefits of economic growth
(Table 3) .
The widening disparity of GMP per capita and the imbal-
ances of population growth between rich and poor regions add
tension to the already present national and regional differ-
13
ences. Not only are the rural areas unlikely to be able to
provide support to other elements of the APD but will harbor
a degree of resentment; they hold the developed regions and
the federal government responsible for their economic plight.
In theory, the developed areas concentrate upon their own
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14development. Rather than assist in the development of the
LDRs, the developed regions feel further development of their
own regions will produce a carryover effect and assist the
LDR in the long run. The developed regions argue that the
LDRs are not progressing under the present system and are
slowing the growth of the developing regions.
TABLE 3.
GROWTH OF GROSS MATERIAL PRODUCT, POPULATION, AND GROSS
MATERIAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA, BY REGION, 1966-75


































SOURCE: Schrenk, Ardalan, Tatawy, 290, table 11.3.
Gross Material Product is the value of material production and
productive services produced by both the socialist and private
sectors in manufacturing, mining, power, agriculture, forestry,
construction, transportation and communications, and trade and
catering; the productive part of crafts and public utilities
sectors are also included. Services and activities regarded
as nonproductive—notably public administration, defense, and
educational and health activities—are excluded.
65

The 1984 Winter Olympics, to be conducted in Sarajevo,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, help illustrate the difficulty. Slovenia
argues that the games should be held in Slovenia because facil-
ities are present and adequate. The money saved by not
constructing new facilities could be invested better. The
local government of Bosnia-Herzegovina urges the development
of the facilities, not only for the short-run return of tourist
dollars, but for long term attraction to future tourists. The
facilities at Sarajevo will be constructed through the taxes
of other republics with no guarantee of investment return
through tourism. Yet, if the federal government does not invest
in Sarajevo, Slovenia will get richer and Bosnia-Herzegovina
will gain little. Will the rich continue to get richer and
the poor poorer? Fred B. Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia
,
expressed the underlying impact best when he said, "regional
differences in economic developments are reinforced by cultur-
al, linguistic and religious differences between the Yugoslav
peoples." "" These regional differences tend to be expressed
in nationalist terms and add to the animosity discussed in
chapter three. They exacerbate the ethnic tensions and create
noncooperation and disunity which could affect the performance
of the APD.
Southern Yugoslavia questions the concept of a united
socialist Yugoslavia when confronted with the wide disparity
of living standards and the decreasing natural resources, while
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the northern republics fail to understand why they should
subsidize the LDRs.
As mentioned, there are intraregional disparities as well.
Within each region there is a wide gulf in productivity and
income between the traditional private agricultural sector
and the modern social urban sector (Table 4) . Average house-
hold income per capita in nonagriculture is about 90 percent
of the national average in the less developed regions. Kosovo
is the clear exception. In most regions the nonagriculture
income per capita is 150 to 200 percent of that in agriculture
TABLE 4.
HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER CAPITA, BY REGION, 197 3
(ALL YUGOSLAVIA HOUSEHOLDS—100)
Household Income per Capita
Region
Agri- Nonagri-
All cultural Mixed cultural
house- house- house- house-
holds holds holds holds
72 58 65 90
76 61 67 100
49 39 48 61
78 66 73 88
82 58 78 94
116 78 104 140
125 85 112 151
100 69 86 128
150 106 135 166











Yugoslavia 100 70 89 125
SOURCE: Schrenk, Ardalan, Tatawy, 29 4, table 11.7.
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The greatest difficulties are found in the areas that
have the highest population growth rate. Larger families
tend to dilute the per capita income per family. This rela-
tive poverty has an impact on the willingness to sustain and
equip a modern fighting force. With the move to the urban
areas there has been an increased neglect of the agricultural
areas; villages have been abandoned and the land has been
untended.
In World War II over 7 5 percent of the Yugoslav population
was considered rural. Today there are 4.2 million private
farmers, or approximately 20 percent, cultivating 85 percent
of the agricultural land. Before the war Yugoslavia was a
net exporter of agricultural products. Today they import
more than $1 billion of agricultural produce (mostly food)
while exporting only $7 million. A symptom of the difficulty
is reflected in market shortages in cooking oil, medicants
,
17detergents, and coffee. This further illuminates a weak-
ness to be faced by Yugoslavia during wartime; the soldier
must be fed. The mountains and hills where the major part
of the defense will be conducted do not provide the agricul-
tural output as do the plains and valleys (those areas that
will most likely be occupied by the invader)
.
When discussing some of the difficulties the Partisans
faced in WW II with Sir Fitzroy Maclean, the British Liaison
Officer, Marshal Tito said, "the economic position of the
population of an area is of first-rate importance to our
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troops. Unlike the enemy we have no stores of food or food
18processing factories in our rear." In peacetime Yugoslavia
is not self-supporting in agriculture; wartime would place a
great burden on the APD. If the TDF and YPA units are forced
into another area of operation, will one unit share already
short food supplies with a unit with language, cultural, or
religious differences? In WW II, both occupying German and
Italian forces as well as Partisan, Chetnik, and Ustasha forces
raped the land and stole foodstuffs from the starving peasants.
The shift of population from rural to urban areas may
also have an impact on the APD. The values of a rural farmer
are quite possibly different from an urbanite. Dennison I.
Rusinow, in The Yugoslav Experiment , suggests the formation
of a new class division in Yugoslavia and that the traditional
19
values have been irreparably breached. Has the Yugoslav
warrior moved to the city? The urbanite looks forward to an
eight-hour work day, higher income, and urban delights while
the farmer faces labor from dusk to dawn, low wages, mud
and boredom.
Changes in values are also reflected by the youth serving
in the youth organizations of the YPA. There are reports
that tours of duty are carried out by other men, for money,
for cigarettes, or other forms of bribery. The more affluent
are able to pay other men to replace them for unsavory jobs
and duties. It appears that the bribery has penetrated the
administration of the organizations. Assignments to duty
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positions such as courier, clerk, or storage man and other
soft jobs away from guard duty and other drudgeries have an
effect on morale.
This urban migration not only has affected personal value
systems but has increased the difficulties for the federal
government. In the less developed areas there are insuffi-
cient jobs and housing, poor transportation systems, and
21inadequate services and utilities.
The LDRs are far from the economic centers of Belgrade,
Zagreb, and Ljubljana. The disadvantages are amplified by
deficiencies in the interregional and intraregional systems
for transport and communications. These deficiencies have
forced the less developed regions to allocate a higher pro-
portion of their investment resources to the development of
this much needed transport and communications infrastructure.
The mountainous topography of all the LDRs and the intra-
regional differences in population density tend to make the
22development of this infrastructure very costly. Further
adding to this transportation problem, Yugoslavia, as a nation,
has attempted to improve the old highway system rather than
23
construct new ones.
Poor transportation networks have adverse effects on mil-
itary operations. Speed, mobility, and operational flexibility
are greatly reduced. The ability to conduct coordinated
operations, envelopments, artillery support, reinforcement,
withdrawals, resupply, and evacuation of wounded will be
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affected. (Again, this deficiency is also concentrated in
the LDRs where this author assumes the majority of the defen-
sive effort will take place.)
The quality of roads differ greatly in individual regions.
This is illustrated in a survey conducted by the Institute of
Investment Economics in 19 69 which stated that of all roads
with improved surfaces 68 percent were poorly and 3 2 percent
well designed. Of all well designed roads 49 percent had a
good surface, 32 percent medium good, and 19 percent a low
quality or worn-out surface. At the same time, of the 68
percent poorly designed roads, 13 percent had a good surface,
44 percent a medium good and 43 percent a low quality or worn-
24
out surface. The West-East roads (the main highway crosses
Slovenia, Croatia and northern Serbia connecting the republic
capitals) do not fully meet the requirements of modern trans-
port, especially with regard to trunk routes. The main lateral
lines (north-south) in the area bordered by the Una and Morava
rivers, which flow through Zagreb, Croatia, and through Bel-
grade, Serbia, respectively, are not efficiently linked by
longitudinal roads. These north-south roads border the less
developed regions. The quality and capacity of access roads
25
to trunk roads are unsatisfactory. Airborne and airmobile
operations by the invader will tend to circumvent this short-
coming. The Yugoslavs cannot intradict these transportation





Road construction and maintenance are primarily financed
by republic and regional road funds—the LDRs have less to
invest in road construction and maintenance. Road construc-
tion also receives money from road users (taxes and tolls)
.
This is another case of the rich getting richer
—
poorly
maintained roads do not attract travelers and therefore
receive less revenue for construction and maintenance.
Another problem facing the federal government and the
APD is arms manufacturing. Tito lamented that the Partisans
26had no factories for producing arms in WW II. Yugoslavia,
in line with its foreign policy of nonalignment, has attempted
to meet its weapons requirements from within. Many of the
smaller aircraft that support the TDF from unimproved air-
fields are made in Yugoslavia. Today it is estimated that
Yugoslavia produces 8 percent of their weapons in Yugoslav
factories. They are attempting to meet the demand for anti-
27
tank and anti-air weapons from within as well. The federal
government simply does not want to place the defense of
Yugoslavia in the hands of a fickle arms dealer that may not
provide arms in time of need or that may attempt to influence
their politics. On the other hand, if Yugoslavia produces a
weapon system that is not compatible with one found on the
international arms market, it will find it difficult to meet




Some military leaders suggest that Yugoslavia depends too
heavily on the domestic production of weapons and military
equipment. Too heavily a reliance on its own manpower, tech-
nology, and material will affect the APD. It is possible
that there are more jobs to be performed than there are people
to perform them. Advanced technological demands for certain
systems may force the federal government to look to a foreign
28
supplier.
The military modernization effort has slowed recently.
The economy cannot respond to the regional disparities and
the APD simultaneously. Col. General Dane Cuic, Secretary
of the Committee of the LCY organization in the YPA, reported
on 22 October 1980, that the YPA would undergo cutbacks in
food, clothing, accommodation and medical expenditures. Funds
for training have also been reduced. The country's own pro-
duction of weapons and military equipment is experiencing
basically the same problems as all of Yugoslavia in the short-
29
age of raw materials and producer goods. This slowdown in
modernization could affect combat readiness.
The Yugoslav economy suffers. The foreign debts total
$18 billion; unemployment stands at 13 percent—an intolerable
level in a country that calls itself communist. The inflation
rate is above 30 percent, and the economy is plagued by
shortages. December 19 80 inflation was 51.2 percent higher
than the year before and a further slowdown of the economy
4. A 31is expected.
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In the past, Yugoslavia was able to relieve the unemploy-
ment by permitting emigration to Western Europe. It has been
estimated that the equivalent of 3 to 5 armies of Yugoslavs,
approximately one million, were in Western Europe. Since
the 19 80 recession in Europe though, many of these guest
workers have returned to Yugoslavia. This return increases
unemployment, removes their income from the economic flow,
and places an increased burden on the system.
As a stone sends ripples across a pond, so does the fal-
tering economy send shock waves across all facets of Yugoslav
life. Regional disparities increase; transportation networks
are not improved; urban social unrest increases; and moderni-
zation of the APD reaches a standstill. All of these factors
tend to place the credibility of the All-People's Defense
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The Yugoslav All-People's Defense system, touted by many
as a deterrent against aggression, is flawed—flawed because
of changes made by the federal government to ease the socio-
ethnic tensions and economic difficulties present in modern-day
Yugoslavia. The "self-management" governmental changes,
decentralization of party and government, and the economic
reform, all place great responsibility on the republics, the
autonomous regions, and the communes to develop, train, and
equipment elements of the APD.
The APD is designed to work in the mid-intensity environment
conventional war with tanks, mechanized infantry combat vehi-
cles, and artillery, with the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA)
and the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) performing joint
operations, as well as in the low-intensity environment uncon-
ventional (guerrilla) war. In a mid-intensity environment,
compatible organization and equipment, and coherent command
and control are required. In the low-intensity environment,
the support of the people is foremost.
This study has brought to light several deficiencies in
vital defense areas that will affect Yugoslavia in both war
environments
:
1. The Yugoslav People's Army lacks modern war-making
equipment. With current cutbacks in defense spending, it is
unlikely that this situation will improve in the near future.
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2. Command and control of the APD is fragmented, with
unclear lines of authority between YPA and TDF. In his
latest book, The End of the Tito Era , Slobodan Stankovic dis-
cusses this problem in depth and concludes that the National
Defense Law and Constitution place the responsibility of
command at the National level with the State Presidency,
Defense Minister, and Council for National Defense. Obviously
the Defense Minister plays the principal role.
When communications links are broken between republics
and the national command, the TDF commanders assume command
of all elements within their borders. This could mean six
or more independent TDF commands, each conducting operations
that may or may not conflict with the national or central
strategies.
3. Yugoslavia suffers from a poor transportation infra-
structure. Flexibility of operations, from artillery support
to reinforcement to resupply, is affected. Realistically
the Yugoslavs do not expect to engage the enemy in a conven-
tional, mid-intensity conflict for more than 72 hours—time
to occupy the invading force long enough to mobilize the APD.
Guerrilla warfare is the forte of the APD. As the battle
ensues, the resupply of ammunition, weapons, spare parts,
food, and medical supplies becomes critical and will probably
be severely hampered by the poor transportation facilities.
4. A major strategy of the APD system is to exhaust the
enemy, to prolong the defense and to hope that assistance
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will be offered. This study asserts that the republics in
the southern regions, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with the province of Kosovo, will have great
difficulty building a credible peacetime force much less
maintaining it during wartime. In the event of war, these
republics would not be able to logistically support any units
forced into their operational area.
5. Probably the most important ingredient is will power
—
the will of the people to support actively and passively all
elements of the APD is somewhat in doubt. Robin Remington
states the problem most succinctly when she asks, "Who would
be fighting for what?" The Yugoslav warrior will fight, but
is the situation similar to WW II when, the territorial detach-
ments were "willing to defend only their own immediate areas
and unwilling to fight resolutely away from home"? As evi-
denced by the recent Kosovo disturbances, ethnic animosities
are still present across Yugoslavia.
The subjective conclusions reached by this study with
regard to physical support of the APD indicate a serious
shortfall in peacetime and a potentially dangerous defect
during wartime (Table 5)
.
The republics and provinces given a composite B evaluation
are all located in the southern mountainous regions where
history indicates the defense will take place. (Slovenia
should be excluded since it is a highly industrialized and
prosperous republic as witnessed by its income per capita even





In peacetime these B regions should find it financially
difficult to equip and support a TDF. The A regions, although
able to devote monies to the APD during peacetime, would soon
lose their productive capabilities and transportation infra-
structure. In reality, they would become the equivalent of
the B regions.
TABLE 5.





Income per Capita a+
A A A B A B B B
A+ A A- B A B B B-
B- A A+ B A B B- B+
B- B- B A 3 B B A+
A- B B- B B
Composite Rating B+ A- B A- B B B+
SOURCES
:
aJack C. Fisher, Yugoslavia-a Multinational State , Chandler
Publishing Company, San Francisco, CA. , 1966, p. 70.
"Road Transport," Yugoslav Survey 15 (Feb 74): 53-66.
c
"Production and Consumption of Wheat," Yugoslav Survey
14 (Feb 73) : 55-68.
dTable 2.
e
"Natural Resources of Yugoslavia,'' Yugoslav Survey 16
(May 75) : 23-50.
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Ironically, even with the deficiencies discussed, Yugo-
slavia has little other choice but the APD. The APD concept
and strategy is an outgrowth of foreign and domestic policy;
it has been influenced by compromise and accomplishes the
following:
1. The APD reinforces Yugoslavia's stated policy of non-
alignment. It projects the image of defense from within,
supported by the people and their self-management economy.
2. The APD permits a far more credible defense strategy
than the massive, expensive post-WW II conventional force.
3. The APD, at least the TDF, is compatible with the
attitude of self-management and decentralization of party
and government.
4. The APD takes advantage of the pride found in the
Yugoslav warrior and the history of Yugoslavia.
When a potential invader evaluates the APD, however, does
he envisage a credible deterrent? Will an invasion unite
these diverse nations and nationalities or will the nation-
state of Yugoslavia rip apart at the seams? This study
suggests that the APD is merely an affectation and when close-
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